Chapter VI
General Rules of Evidence
under the WTO Jurisprudence


OUTLINE

I Burden of Proof under the WTO Jurisprudence
(ⅰ) General Rules Well Established in Violation Complaints
(ⅱ) Burden of Proof in case of Invoking an Exception
(ⅲ) Special Rules Concerning Non-Violation Claims
(ⅳ) Summary and Conclusions
II Admissibility of Certain Evidences
(ⅰ) Evidence Obtained from Prior Consultations
(a) Procedural Concern: Confidentiality of Consultations
(b) Substantial Concern: Necessity or Relevance of Evidence
(ⅱ) Arguments before Domestic Investigative Authorities
(ⅲ) Arguments Submitted after the First Substantive Meeting
(a) There is a significant difference between the claims and the arguments supporting those claims.
(b)There is no provision establishing precise deadlines for the presentation of evidence.
III Panel’s Right to Seek Information
(ⅰ) A Grant of Discretionary Authority
(ⅱ) The Admissibility of Non-requested Information
(ⅲ) Summary and Conclusions
IV Adverse Inferences from Party’s Refusal to Provide Information Requested
(ⅰ) The Authority of a Panel to Request Information from a Party to the Dispute
(ⅱ) The Duty of a Member to Comply with the Request of a Panel to Provide Information
(ⅲ) The Drawing of Adverse Inferences from the Refusal of a Party to Provide Information Requested by the Panel
V Concluding Remarks

I Burden of Proof under the WTO Jurisprudence
Generally, the question of whether a member acted in accordance with the agreement hinges frequently on whether and to what extent that member must demonstrate compliance or the complaint must demonstrate a lack of compliance. It is demonstrated that the burden of proof is a procedural concept which speaks to the fair and orderly management and disposition of a dispute. This is the issue of “the ultimate burden of proof for establishing a claim or a defence”. In this respect, the Panel Report on US-Copyright Act (DS160) states, “[w]hile a duty rests on all parties to produce evidence and to cooperate in presenting evidence to the Panel, this is an issue that has to be distinguished from the question of who bears the ultimate burden of proof for establishing a claim or a defence”.1
(i) General Rules Well Established in Violation Complaints
Art. 3.8 of the DSU provides that in cases where there is an infringement of the obligations assumed under a covered agreement -- that is, in cases where a violation is established -- there is a presumption of nullification or impairment. However, the issue of burden of proof here is not what happens after a violation is established; the issue is which party must first show that there is, or is not, a violation. In this respect, a number of GATT 1947 panel reports contain language supporting the proposition that the burden of establishing a violation under Article XXIII:1(a) of the GATT 1947 was on the complaining party, i.e., it was for the complaining party to present a prima facie case of violation before a panel. This rule is taken on by the DSB.
With regard to the issue of burden of proof, the Appellate Body in US-Shirts and Blouses (DS33) rules that: “In addressing this issue, we find it difficult, indeed, to see how any system of judicial settlement could work if it incorporated the proposition that the mere assertion of a claim might amount to proof. It is, thus, hardly surprising that various international tribunals, including the International Court of Justice, have generally and consistently accepted and applied the rule that the party who asserts a fact, whether the claimant or the respondent, is responsible for providing proof thereof. Also, it is a generally-accepted canon of evidence in civil law, common law and, in fact, most jurisdictions, that the burden of proof rests upon the party, whether complaining or defending, who asserts the affirmative of a particular claim or defence. If that party adduces evidence sufficient to raise a presumption that what is claimed is true, the burden then shifts to the other party, who will fail unless it adduces sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption.” 2And this ruling is demonstrated to be well established in subsequent cases as a general rule concerning burden of proof.
For example, in Argentina-Leather (DS155), the Panel states: “The relevant rules concerning burden of proof, while not expressly provided for in the DSU, are well established in WTO jurisprudence. The general rule is set out in the Appellate Body report on United States - Measure Affecting Imports of Woven Wool Shirts and Blouses, wherein it is stated that: ‘It is a generally-accepted canon of evidence in civil law, common law and, in fact, most jurisdictions, that the burden of proof rests upon the party, whether complaining or defending, who asserts the affirmative of a particular claim or defence. If that party adduces evidence sufficient to raise a presumption that what is claimed is true, the burden then shifts to the other party, who will fail unless it adduces sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption’.” 3
And in US-Cotton Yarn (DS192), the Panel rules in pertinent part: “The Appellate Body and subsequent panels endorsed this principle that a complainant bears the burden of proof. For example, the Appellate Body, in EC - Hormones, states as follows: ‘… The initial burden lies on the complaining party, which must establish a prima facie case of inconsistency with a particular provision of the SPS Agreement on the part of the defending party, or more precisely, of its SPS measure or measures complained about. When that prima facie case is made, the burden of proof moves to the defending party, which must in turn counter or refute the claimed inconsistency. This seems straightforward enough and is in conformity with our ruling in United States - Shirts and Blouses, which the Panel invokes and which embodies a rule applicable in any adversarial proceedings.’” 4
As a whole, on the one hand, as ruled by the Panel in Argentina-Ceramic Floor Tiles (DS189), “[w]e recall that the burden of proof in WTO dispute settlement proceedings rests with the party that asserts the affirmative of a particular claim or defence. It implies that the complaining party will be required to make a prima facie case of violation of the relevant provisions of the WTO Agreement, which is for the defendant…to refute. In this regard, the Appellate Body has stated that ‘... a prima facie case is one which, in the absence of effective refutation by the defending party, requires a panel, as a matter of law, to rule in favour of the complaining party presenting the prima facie case’…”; 5 on the other hand, as noted in the Panel Report on US-Copyright Act (DS160), “[t]he same rules apply where the existence of a specific fact is alleged. We note that a party who asserts a fact, whether the claimant or the respondent, is responsible for providing proof thereof. It is for the party alleging the fact to prove its existence. It is then for the other party to submit evidence to the contrary if it challenges the existence of that fact”. 6
In sum, with respect to the general rules of burden of proof in the context of violation complaints, as ruled by the Panel in Japan-Film (DS44): “[w]e note that as in all cases under the WTO/GATT dispute settlement system - and, indeed, as the Appellate Body recently stated, under most systems of jurisprudence - it is for the party asserting a fact, claim or defence to bear the burden of providing proof thereof. Once that party has put forward sufficient evidence to raise a presumption that what is claimed is true, the burden of producing evidence then shifts to the other party to rebut the presumption.…”. 7Certainly, as noted by the Appellate Body in US-Shirts and Blouses (DS33), “[i]n the context of the GATT 1994 and the WTO Agreement precisely how much and precisely what kind of evidence will be required to establish such a presumption will necessarily vary from measure to measure, provision to provision and case to case”.8
(ii) Burden of Proof in case of Invoking an Exception
As discussed above, generally, the burden of proof rests upon the party, whether complaining or defending, who asserts a fact or the affirmative of a particular claim or defence. As to be shown, this rule applies equally even in case of invoking an exception.
In this context, it is a general principle of law, well-established by panels in prior GATT/WTO practice, that the party (the defendant) which invokes an exception in order to justify its action carries the burden of proof that it has fulfilled the conditions for invoking the exception. However, in the author’s view, to understand the issue concerning burden of proof in case of invoking an exception, which is different from the relatively clear burden of establishing a prima facie case of violation on the complaining party, it’s helpful to stress some points here, among which the key point is to be cautious while determine which defence is “affirmative” and therefore burdens the defendant to provide sufficient evidence to rebut the challenged violation.
In United States-Shirts and Blouses (DS33), India argues that it was “customary GATT practice” that the party invoking a provision which had been identified as an exception must offer proof that the conditions set out in that provision were met. The Appellate Body acknowledges that several GATT 1947 and WTO panels have required such proof of a party invoking a defence, such as those found in Art. XX or Art. XI:2(c)(i), to a claim of violation of a GATT obligation, such as those found in Arts. I:1, II:1, III or XI:1. Arts. XX and XI:(2)(c)(i) are limited exceptions from obligations under certain other provisions of the GATT 1994, not positive rules establishing obligations in themselves. They are in the nature of affirmative defences. It is only reasonable that the burden of establishing such a defence, i.e. invoking an exception in the nature of affirmative defences, should rest on the party asserting it. 9
However, as ruled by the Appellate Body in EC-Hormones (DS26/DS48), “[t]he general rule in a dispute settlement proceeding requiring a complaining party to establish a prima facie case of inconsistency with a provision of …[the covered agreements] before the burden of showing consistency with that provision is taken on by the defending party, is not avoided by simply describing that same provision as an ‘exception’. In much the same way, merely characterizing a treaty provision as an ‘exception’ does not by itself justify a ‘stricter’ or ‘narrower’ interpretation of that provision than would be warranted by examination of the ordinary meaning of the actual treaty words, viewed in context and in the light of the treaty's object and purpose, or, in other words, by applying the normal rules of treaty interpretation. It is also well to remember that a prima facie case is one which, in the absence of effective refutation by the defending party, requires a panel, as a matter of law, to rule in favour of the complaining party presenting the prima facie case.” 10
In short, during the process of the establishment of a violation, it’s generally up to the complainant to provide evidence concerning inconsistency, and only in case of limited exceptions the burden of proof rests upon the defending party invoking a defence in the nature of affirmative defences, such as those found in Art. XX or Art. XI:2(c)(i) of the GATT 1994.
(iii) Special Rules Concerning Non-Violation Claims
As suggested by the corresponding provisions, the most significant difference between violation complaints under Art. XXIII:1(a) of the GATT 1994 and non-violation ones under Art. XXIII:1(b) is, while, when violation complaints are brought under Art. XXIII:1(a), the infringement of an obligation of the agreements is considered prima facie to constitute a case of nullification or impairment, from the fact of violation alone, by establishing a formal presumption, such a presumption does not exist in non-violation cases.
With the lack of such a presumption, and given the nature of the factually complex disputes and particular claims of non-violation nullification or impairment, the resolution of issues relating to the proper allocation of the burden of proof is of particular importance. In case of non-violation nullification or impairment, i.e., where the application of Art. XXIII:1(b) is concerned, Art. 26.1(a) of the DSU and panel practice in the context of the WTO Agreement and GATT jurisprudence confirm that this is an exceptional course of action for which the complaining party bears the burden of providing a detailed justification to back up its allegations.
This requirement has been recognized and applied by a number of GATT panels. For example, the panel on Uruguayan Recourse to Art. XXIII noted that in cases “where there is no infringement of GATT provisions, it would be ... incumbent on the country invoking Article XXIII to demonstrate the grounds and reasons for its invocation. Detailed submissions on the part of that contracting party on these points were therefore essential for a judgement to be made under this Article”. And the panel on US - Agricultural Waiver noted, in applying the 1979 codification of this rule: “The party bringing a complaint under [Article XXIII:1(b)] would normally be expected to explain in detail that benefits accruing to it under a tariff concession have been nullified or impaired”.
Art. 26.1(a) of the DSU codifies the prior GATT practice, which provides in relevant part: “the complaining party shall present a detailed justification in support of any complaint relating to a measure which does not conflict with the relevant covered agreement ...”.
论我国 《海商法》中“提单持有人”的内涵限定与外延拓展
郑 梁

摘 要：“提单持有人”是海商法中基本的涉人概念之一，在某种意义上是连结海上货物运输法和国际货物买卖法这两大领域的枢纽。然而，我国现行法律对此规定并不明确，相关条文之间亦存在逻辑矛盾。本文试图运用比较分析和判例解读的方法，对我国《海商法》中的“提单持有人”及其内涵与外延作一相对清晰的界定。

关键词： 提单持有人； 认定要件；外延；判例研究


“任何一门科学成熟的标志，总是表现为将已经取得的理性知识的成果——概念、范畴、定律和原理系统化，构成一个科学的理论体系” ，而“理性认识的发生和发展是一个形成概念范畴、并将概念范畴序列化、体系化的过程，同时也是理论和理论体系形成和发展的过程。” 笔者以为，对《中华人民共和国海商法》的修正工作同样需要从规范和统一其中的基本概念范畴做起。以“提单持有人”这一概念为例，提单持有人/收货人作为提单债权关系中的两方当事人当无疑义，然而我国现行法律恰恰对何谓提单持有人并无明确界定，进一步而言，学界对于是否有必要设立“提单持有人”概念亦有争议。本文通过比较研究国外相关立法，结合近年国内的海商司法实践，试图对“提单持有人”的内涵与外延作出更加明确、合理的界定。

一、“提单持有人”概念的立法模式
现今各主要海运公约（草案）及世界各主要海运国家的海商法典对于“提单持有人”概念的界定方式可大致分为以下三类：其一，明确界定型，典型代表为美国1916年《联邦提单法》、英国《1992年海上货物运输法》及2002年“CMI运输法草案”； 其二，间接规定型，如1994年《挪威海商法》及1999年《俄罗斯联邦商船航运法典》； 其三，无专门规定型，台湾地区1999年修订《海商法》 及目前海运领域的三大国际公约皆属此种类型
我国《海商法》亦未就“提单持有人”定义作专门规定，但在该法第71、78和95条中多处涉及提单持有人的权利义务的相关规定，第77条也间接提及这一概念，并直接导致与第78条间的逻辑矛盾，具体而言：
第77条：“除依照本法第75条的规定做出保留外，承运人或者代其签发提单的人签发的提单，是承运人已经按照提单所载状况收到货物或者货物已经装船的初步证据；承运人向善意受让提单的包括收货人在内的第三人提出的与提单所载状况不同的证据，不予承认。”
第78条：“承运人同收货人、提单持有人之间的权利、义务关系，依据提单的规定确定。收货人、提单持有人不承担在装货港发生的滞期费、亏舱费和其他与装货有关的费用，但是提单中明确载明上述费用由收货人、提单持有人承担的除外。”
从前述第77条的字面意思看，“收货人”显然被受让提单的“第三人”亦即“提单持有人”所涵盖，而从第78条措词看，立法者又把“收货人”同“提单持有人”并列处理，其间的矛盾之处显而易见。

二、 “提单持有人”的认定要件
如前所述，尽管美国1916年《联邦提单法》、英国《1992年海上货物运输法》及2002年“CMI运输法草案”都对“提单持有人”概念做出了明确的界定，但又有明显的差异。
《Pomerene Bills of Lading ACT 1916 》Sec.80101.Definitions (4)：“’Holder’means a person having possession of, and a property right in, a bill of lading.”由此，为该法认定的“提单持有人”必须具备两个要件：其一，实际占有提单；其二，享有该提单的权利。但该法并没有进一步说明何谓“有提单权利的人”，显然，我们无法要求承运人在凭单交货前先识别对方是否为“有提单权利的人”。
《Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1992》5.Interpretation etc.(2) References in
this Act to the holder of a bill of lading are references to any of the following persons, that is to say: (a) a person with possession of the bill who, by virtue of being the person identified in the bill, is the consignee of the goods to which the bill relates; (b) a person with possession of the bill as a result of the completion, by delivery of the bill, of any endorsement of the bill or, in the case of a bearer bill, of any other transfer of the bill; (c) a person with possession of the bill as a result of any transaction by virtue of which he would have become a holder falling within paragraph (a) or (b) above had not the transaction been effected at a time when possession of the bill no longer gave a right (as against the carrier) to possession of the goods to which the bill relates; and a person shall be regarded for the purposes of this Act as having become the lawful holder of a bill of lading wherever he has become the holder of the bill in good faith.
从中我们不难归纳出英国法下提单持有人的认定要件：首先，实际占有提单；其次，通过合法方式取得提单，具体包括：1、提单上注明 ；2、提单的背书或交付转让；3、提单善意取得。
2002年“CMI运输法草案”1.12规定：“‘持单人’系指以下人士：（a）暂时拥有可转让的运输单证或独家[检索]/[控制]可转让的电子记录，和（b）具备下列条件中的任何一个：（一）如果该单证为订货单，而此人在其中被认定为托运人或收货人，或是该单证的适当背书人，或（二）如果该单证为空白背书订货单或无记名单证，而此人是这类单证的持有人，或（三）如果使用了可转让的电子记录，而此人根据第 2.4条能够证明其可[检索][控制]这种记录。”可见CMI运输法草案对“持有人”的认定标准相对较低，除了要求对单证或电子记录的“暂时拥有”（或“控制”）外，并没有明示此种“控制”是否必须“合法”。显然，这一规定流于宽泛，有碍于交易安全。
因此，有学者认为英国法的做法更值得借鉴，进而提出“提单持有人”是指占有提单并通过提单签发或提单的正当转让程序取得这种占有的人。” 依据这一定义，托运人和提单瑕疵转让中的善意持有人均被包括在内。对于后者，应无疑异，只是我国目前尚无完整的动产善意取得制度，更无提单善意取得的配套规定；同时，由于我国《海商法》第42条第3款对“托运人”所下定义的特殊性，导致学界围绕所谓“第二种托运人”的身份地位问题，以及在FOB贸易合同下，承运人到底应将提单签发给谁，即谁是FOB贸易合同下提单的“第一合法持有人”问题持续争论，此即当“托运人”自己持单向承运人主张权利时，如何界定其身份的问题。

三、 提单持有人的外延研究
作为提单法律关系的一方主体，“提单持有人”是一相对宽泛的概念，在不同情形下，托运人、收货人、货物所有权人和提单质押权人都有可能成为“持有提单的人”，但笔者以为，“持有提单的人”并不能与“提单持有人”划等号。
（一）托运人是否能成为提单持有人？
美国1916年《联邦提单法》明文规定“提单持有人”“不包括通过承运人签发提单而持有提单的人。” 英国1992年《海上货物运输法》没有将托运人明文排除在外，但从该法第5条第2款第1项的规定，应该可以推导出在托运人同时也是记名指示提单的收货人时，属于“提单持有人”。同时，根据联合国国际贸易法委员会第三工作组（运输法）对“运输法草案”1.12的解释，“持单人”可包括托运人、收货人和任何可能的中间持有人，同时还包括他们的代理人。我国《海商法》没有明文规定当托运人持有提单时是否也能称为“提单持有人”。从第78条的规定看，“承运人同收货人、提单持有人之间的权利、义务关系，依据提单的规定确定。”也即上述三者间构成通常所说的“提单法律关系”，显然有别于承运人与托运人之间的“运输合同关系”。因此，从这个意义上来说，托运人即使实际持有提单，其地位也与提单法律关系中的“提单持有人”不同，两者理应区别对待。 但问题在于，根据我国《海商法》第42条第3款对“托运人”的定义，托运人包括“缔约托运人”和“交货托运人”，当承运人把提单签发给“交货托运人”比如FOB贸易合同下的卖方时，同一提单下可能同时存在两个合法的托运人，而此时的“交货托运人”同时也可能是实际上持有提单的人，此时“交货托运人”与承运人的关系究竟是以运输合同为准还是以提单记载为准，不无疑问。
“交货托运人”事实上并未与承运人缔约，其与承运人之间的关系不受运输合同制约应无疑异；那么FOB贸易合同下持有提单的卖方是否理所当然地取得“提单持有人”的地位而将其与承运人间的关系置于提单规定之下呢？
《汉堡规则》首先对第二种托运人作出了规定，其目的在于“以法律的形式赋予FOB项下卖方把自己写入提单‘托运人’栏的权利，确定了其作为托运人的法律地位” 。一般认为，尽管我国《海商法》对第二种托运人的规定与《汉堡规则》略有出入，但立法意图应是相同的，即使FOB贸易合同下卖方被记载于‘托运人’栏的权利合法化。基于上述理解，笔者认为FOB贸易合同下卖方取得交货托运人资格的前提也应该是其名字被记载于提单“托运人”一栏，换言之，未被记载于提单上“托运人”一栏的卖方，无权要求承运人签发提单。 然而在实务中却大量存在着尽管提单托运人栏记载为FOB合同买方,但承运人仍将提单签发给卖方的情形。由此很自然地产生另一个问题：当FOB合同下的卖方持有托运人栏记载为买方的提单，且提单尚未流转出去时，该卖方的身份如何？
二、相关判例研究
我国早年的司法实践曾认为当FOB合同下的卖方持有托运人栏记载为买方的提单，且提单尚未流转出去时，该卖方无权依据提单享有诉权。 显然，如此一来，对于FOB合同下的卖方而言，其处境非常被动。因此，近年来的司法实践在此问题上已有了明显改变：

判例一、“厦门建发公司诉香港美通船务有限公司案”

厦门海事法院的判决肯定了FOB术语卖方具有“实际托运人”法律地位的观点。该案中原告作为FOB术语的卖方出运货物后，取得承运人签发的托运人栏记载为买方、收货人凭买方指示的提单。承运人在目的港没有收回正本提单的情况下，将货物放给了买方。原告认为:根据我国《海商法》第42条关于托运人的定义，托运人包括FOB术语将货物实际交给承运人的发货人。被告向原告签发了提单，证明被告承认原告的托运人法律地位。原告有权凭提单向被告主张权利。

该案经过一审和上诉，法院的判决均支持原告的观点。二审法院在介绍该案时，重点指出:该案涉及的买卖合同为FOB术语条件，原告作为货物卖方，虽然未记载为提单托运人，但其因实际交付货物，可以成为海上货物运输合同的托运人。因为法律并没有将提单上的记载作为托运人成立的条件之一，所以是否在提单上记载并不影响卖方成为交货托运人。从法律的相关规定来看，既然《海商法》已经明确规定了托运人的定义，应该认为符合法律规定的两个条件之一的人就是托运人，“法律没有将在提单上的记载作为认定托运人地位的条件之一，因此应该认为是否在提单上记载并不影响一方成为托运人。反之，如果一方并不符合法律规定的条件，仅在提单上被记名为托运人，这也并不能使他成为真正的托运人”。法院判决确认了FOB术语卖方为运输合同托运人。承运人无单放货行为违反了运输合同规定承运人有凭正本提单交付货物的义务，对此造成托运人的损失，作为托运人一方的FOB术语卖方当然有权提出索赔权。法院进一步认为:“我国《海商法》关于交付货物托运人的定义，正是考虑到了实际操作的情况，为了保护卖方的实际利益才做这样的规定。”

判例二、“浙江纺织集团公司诉长荣国际储运有限公司案”
原告同案外人买方签订了FOB术语条件的货物出口合同，信用证方式付款。嗣后卖方依据合同通过货代公司向承运人订舱出运货物，支付了运费，并取得了承运人的代理人签发的正本海运提单。由于货物的出运超过了信用证规定的期限，浙江纺织公司托收货款，但无人赎单，全套贸易单证由银行退回。而承运人在涉案提单均未收回的情况下将货物放行，卖方凭提单诉承运人无单放货。

在该案中，被告(承运人)以提单上记载的托运人并不是卖方为由，主张卖方并不是运输合同中的托运人，卖方与承运人之间不存在运输合同关系。初审法院和二审法院对被告的观点并不支持。法院认为:原告委托货代公司向作为被告的承运人交付货物，支付运费，并提出了缮制提单的具体要求，被告则完全按照原告的要求签发提单，将第三家国外公司记载为名义托运人，并从货代公司处收取了涉案运费。上述事实足以证明原告和被告之间事实上建立了海上货物运输合同关系。因此法院判定原告即是缔约托运人，被告所主张的关于双方之间并无运输合同关系的上诉理由没有事实和法律依据，法院并不支持。

三、对上述两案的评析
从表面上看，前述两案中法院最终都确认了卖方的托运人地位，但具体的判决理由和推导过程却有本质上的区别。

就案一而言，法院完全没有考虑承运人向卖方签发提单的合法性问题，而是通过对现行法条的机械解释，将此时的卖方定位为托运人并进而赋予其诉权。按照这样思路，在同一运输合同下岂不是又同时出现了两个“托运人”？显然这又带来了新的问题。 因此，笔者认为此案的判决结果是值得商榷的。